Honesty as Policy

Anti-USAID graffiti
(photo credit: dlisbona)

Right now, when donor governments give foreign aid, they do so on the basis of friendship and altruism. While that is certainly one reason, it’s not the whole story. Focusing only on that motivation leaves our partners filling in the gap with their own often destructive theories. In most cases, a powerful motivation for supporting development aid is the desire to live in a safer world. Helping other countries grow healthy and prosperous will makes us all safer. That is a perfectly acceptable reason to give aid.

If we speak honestly about the role of self-interest in international development, it would help us do our work better. It would empower host countries, reduce the idea that aid is basically a bribe to get something from the developing country, and improve community acceptance.

Empowering Host Countries

If we’re giving assistance for no reason other than the kindness of our hearts it puts us in a superior position. We’re the wealthy generous people, helping the poor who need our help. It is inherently disempowering to the people we work with – governments, communities, and individuals.

But, if we both have something to offer and something to gain – that is a partnership. Example: Haiti needs peace and prosperity. The US needs Haiti to stop exporting refugees and start buying the stuff we make. We can work together to make that happen. I think this explains, to a large degree, the success of social entrepreneurship. If you take generosity out of the equation, everyone is equal. And equality is a much better place to start.

Changing the Government View of Foreign Aid

Many, many, many foreign leaders see the world from a pure cold war realpolitik perspective. They assume that development aid is a quid pro quo and it’s given to win their geopolitical support. They genuinely don’t believe that aid could be given for another reason.

If development aid is just barter for geopolitical support, then it doesn’t matter if the aid projects are effective. It doesn’t matter what kind of work is supported. In fact, it doesn’t need to be development aid at all. It could just as easily be helicopters, weapons, or a new set of gold toilets for the dictator’s palace. Especially in countries where top-level leadership is corrupt, this doesn’t lead to host country support for development efforts.

While increased GDP and national prosperity benefits everyone, plenty of the short term efforts needed to bring that about have losers. Corrupt elites in particular tend to suffer, and they can and will oppose development projects for that reason. Strong support is needed from the host country is required to push past that. Knowing that the donor country values successful development efforts because it’s also dependent on the outcome helps to generate that support.

A caveat. Making donor interest in development clear could also lead to host government efforts to hold aid impact hostage. “If you care so much about regulatory reform, we’ll keep it from happening until you buy seven gold toilets.” But even that kind of gamesmanship is a game that takes impacts seriously, and is a form of empowerment, however unpleasant. And a donor can take the long view and refuse to play.

Community Acceptance

In my own career, I have been asked over and over by community leaders, local government officials, and plenty of other people why the US is funding the project I work for. They are curious, and they’re suspicious. They’ve seen enough American movies not to think Americans are saintly and loving. We must have a reason for doing something so good. But what is it? Having no clear answer makes us look suspicious.

Think of the famous case of the Nigerian religious leaders who refused polio vaccines. I strongly suspect that one reason they refused was that were looking for ulterior motives. Why would Americans want to send vaccines for Nigerian kids? Altruism alone didn’t make sense as an explanation, so they found another – the vaccines causes AIDS and sterility. They had also already been mistreated once by the international pharmaceutical industry, deepening their doubts. What if we’d said in the first place, “We want your kids to grow up strong and healthy so that they work hard, get rich, buy American products and don’t become terrorists.” That’s an ulterior motive that makes sense.

In defense of the Millennium Challenge Corporation

I was recently contacted by someone asking me to help in their campaign to get the MCC to reverse their decision on suspending funding to Nicaragua. I declined, and I thought my logic might be useful to other people.

The Millennium Challenge Corporation was specifically designed as a funding agency that would provide support to countries that adhere to certain standards of good governance. Its purpose was to set high governance standards, reward the countries that achieved them, and suspend funding for the countries that did not. From their website: “MCC is based on the principle that aid is most effective when it reinforces good governance, economic freedom and investments in people.” Biased municipal elections legitimately qualify as “a significant policy decline or policy reversal,” in the MCC criteria for suspension of funds.

You can object to the establishment of the MCC, and argue that all US funding for international development should go through USAID, which makes an effort to support development over political pressure, although it is not always allowed to do so. You can also, as I suggested on the SGHE blog, advocate for giving USAID more autonomy and immunity from political pressure.

However, I don’t think it is fair, or a good use of time and energy, to lobby MCC to go against its own stated policies. I don‘t think they will do it, and I don’t think we should ask them to. If you want aid with this kind of conditionality, I suggest you lobby Congress for the end of the MCC. They could easily move the Millennium Challenge Account funds to USAID, and have them take over current projects and select future ones.

I myself don’t object to the MCC. I wouldn’t want to see all US foreign assistance subject to this kind of process, because there are many countries with restrictive, undemocratic governments with people who need and deserve development assistance. However, as an experiment with its own separate funding stream, I think MCC is doing some things we could learn from.

We’re seeing a lot of discussion right now about aid conditionality. A decent summary of the arguments is here. I’ve seen some interesting reports that say it does lead to good governance, and some convincing papers that it does not. MCC’s obsessive focus on indicator tracking could actually give us some definitive answers on whether a big chunk of governance-conditional aid actually affects things.

What we can learn from missionaries

missionary kids

I’m going to start with #9, because a lot of you asked about it. And I don’t want people thinking I was suggesting we convert people to, well, anything. No pith helmets, bibles, Korans, or books of Mormon here. Development has nothing – nothing – to do with salvation.

But missionaries do have a model we can learn from, at least the ones that I have met. They come into a country with a long-term commitment. They don’t just want immediate results; they want souls. Missionaries bring their families and children with them, and those children go to local schools. They live in houses that are nice by local standards, but not in the expat palaces your average foreigner inhabits. They bring their stuff with them in suitcases, not container ships.

Missionaries don’t try to do any soul-saving at first, spending a minimum of six months learning local language and culture. Mormons are renowned for their language skills. And once they have learned it, they stick around, spending years or even decades in country. They devote themselves to work in one particular place.

Compare that to your average expatriate working in development, for a donor or implementing a project. The expat lives in a little bubble of fake-home, cushioned by consumable shipments, huge shipping allowances, and hardship pay. With air conditioning and heating to ensure they’re even in a different climate. And they stay in one place for approximately 35 seconds.

Good people don’t have time to get great, and average people don’t even have time to get good. Complicated programs suffer as a result, and funding is biased toward things that are easy to implement and understand. No one has time to learn local context.

Donor governments rarely have people in place for longer than five years. In some cases, it’s not even allowed. Implementers are the same way. Three to five years, on average. The incentives are to keep moving from place to place. If you get a job in, say, Hanoi, while you’re already living in Hanoi, do you get housing and shipping and expat allowances? No. You get brought on as a local hire, and whatever salary they think you’ll settle for. If you want the big package, you apply for a job somewhere else.

And the ambitious, hard-working people who are good at running programs are usually chasing that big package. Think of the one guy you know who’s been in country for ten years, taking jobs with different projects as he can find them. Is he full of useful his skills and local knowledge? No, mostly he’s just a loser. Usually he doesn’t even have language skills to show for his decade of residence. If you set things up so that the ambitious people need to hop, then they will hop. The only ones who stay in place will be the people without the ability to move on. That doesn’t support good program management.

It’s even more painful with the donor types. At least program staff are bound by the specific terms of their grant or contract. An incompetent or philosophically opposed country director can only do so much damage. Every two or three years, someone brand new comes in, with the authority to radically alter all current programs. There’s a six month learning curve while they sort out their job and get some clue about the country. Then a nice two years, at best, of reasonably competent donor oversight, and then they’re emotionally checked out and focused on the next posting.

I’ve seen USAID country directors come in and kill programs that they thought weren’t working. And they were, but they were also hard to understand. Too hard to figure out in a couple weeks of reading reports.

Host country donor staff make a major difference in institutional competence, but it’s a rare donor who lets national staff run their programs. The fear is corruption, mostly, but there is also a capacity problem. The people with the education and skills to really run a donor program aren’t working for USAID, World Bank, or CIDA salaries.

Two years of reasonably competent donor oversight is a depressing best case scenario. When you have a really good donor representative, they are like an extra brain for your efforts. They can help you dodge problems, adapt quickly to challenges, and negotiate different government relationships. It’s a synergy that can make all the difference.

And it pretty much never happens. More often than not, your funder’s representative doesn’t speak the local language and doesn’t even know the nation’s major cities before they land. No matter how smart or committed you are, you don’t have time in a few years to get up to speed enough to be really useful. One of the very few things we know about what works in development is that your interventions need to be precisely targeted to the local context. We can’t do that if nobody knows enough about the local context to make that happen. And how do you take a long view on development when no one stays for enough time to think that way?

So that’s what we can learn from missionaries. Stick around until you know what you’re doing. Project managers, and donor representatives, should have regional knowledge and language skills. They should be deeply steeped in local culture. We need incentives to get good people to stay in one place and become experts at it. Well, first we need it to be permitted. Then we need incentives.

If we’re uncomfortable keeping country directors around for the long haul because of corruption concerns, then we could keep other people in country instead. Technical people, for example. You could have some just-rotated-in manager making the final decisions, guided by a team who’s been working in this context long enough to know what works. You also need host country nationals in as many positions of authority as possible. Get past those corruption fears with good financial controls, ethics training, and employee mentoring. (Yes, it’s an incomplete solution, but so is rotating people constantly to keep them from getting attached.)

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Photo credit: bp6316
Chosen because they look exactly like the missionary kids I see in Tajikistan.

Ten ways to make development work better

skeleton

This is the heart of whatever it is I am writing – my ten core principles for improving the provision of international aid and the implementation of development projects. I have decided to just keep writing while I figure out what form this document takes – white paper, article, book. For now, I offer you the skeleton. I’ll expand on each of these ten in future posts.

I realize there isn’t a whole lot to comment on, or for that matter, read, here, but I’d love any comments you have on my basics here.

1. Evidence-based development.
2. Fund people, not concepts.
3. More, smaller programs, more flexibility to change.
4. Longer funding cycles.
5. Focus on self-interest in international development.
6. Get real about donor coordination; it occurs primarily through individual relationships.
7. Recognize not all governments have the best interests of their populations at heart. You can’t have general policies for host country collaboration.
8. Tags, not categories.
9. Forget the private sector; learn from missionaries. Cultivate regional and technical expertise.
10. Kill off the development studies programs.

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photo credit: perpetualplum
Chosen because it was going to have to be either a skeleton or a big 10.

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